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OF UTAH, FRANK S. WARNER, OLOF E. ZUNDEL, AND 
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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Public Service Commission, Frank S. Warner, 
Olof E, Zundel, and James N. Kimball, adopt the Statement 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to have the Report and Order 
of March 3, 1976, affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents Public Service Commission of Utah, 
Frank S. Warner, Olof E. Zundel and James N. Kimball, 
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Commissioners, adopt the Statement of Facts set forth 
in the brief of respondent Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. 
I. 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OBTAINED 
JURISDICTION TO REHEAR THE CASE FROM RULE 
60(b)(7) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
In general, once a court has rendered its 
decision/ that decision becomes binding and final 
unless a timely appeal has been made. However, the 
legislature realized that occasionally final judgments 
would produce harsh and undesirable results. Hence, 
to alleviate possible inequities that might occur, 
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was 
enacted. Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P. provides: 
"(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable 
Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons; (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered 
in time to move for a new trial under Rule 
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denom-
inated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresen-
tation, or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons 
in an action has not been personally served 
upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) 
and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action; (5) the judgment is void; 
(6) the judgment has been satisfied, released, 
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon 
which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have 
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prospective application; or (7) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons 
(1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken* A 
motion under this subdivision (b) does not 
affect the finality of a judgment or sus-
pend its operation. This rule does not 
limit the power of a court to entertain 
an independent action to relieve a party 
from a judgment, order or proceeding or 
to set aside a judgment for fraud upon 
the court. The procedure for obtaining 
any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or 
by an independent action." (Emphasis 
added.) 
This rule allows a judicial body to set aside 
a final judgment in order to achieve justice. The 
problem lies in the fact that the court must decide 
between two valid considerations. On the one hand, 
there must be an end to litigation. Once a decision 
has been made, interested parties should be able to 
rely on that decision. On the other hand, the court 
attempts to see that justice is promoted; that a 
party receives its fair day in court. Obviously, 
its a matter of discretion. The court must look at 
the totality of the circumstances and then render 
what it considers to be a just and fair decision. 
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Prior to the time that the Commission 
granted the rehearing, it felt that the applicant 
had presented sufficient evidence to warrant a new 
hearing but felt bound by what it thought was the law. 
Quoting from the Public Service Commission's Order 
dated August 1, 19 75, wherein it states: 
"The commission is of the opinion 
that sufficient reason for rehearing ~ 
has been made to appear. However, 
Section 54-7-15, U.C.A. (1953) provides 
that applications for rehearing must 
be made prior to the effective date of 
the order or decision or within twenty 
days thereafter. The application in the 
present case was not within said time." 
(R. 154) (Emphasis added). 
Based on Section 54-7-15 of the Code and the fact 
that the Public Service Commission was under the 
mistaken impression of just what an applicant had 
to prove in order to transfer a number of contracts 
under the same permit, the Commission denied defendant's 
request for a rehearing. Then, in August 19 75, the 
Utah Supreme Court handed down the Pickering decision 
(Murphy v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 539 P.2d 
367 (1975)), which held that it was unnecessary to 
prove each and every contract in order to obtain 
a permit. 
Using Rule 60(b)(7) and the Pickering decision, 
as its basis, defendant Duane Hall again filed for 
a rehearing. 
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The motion was made within a reasonable 
time; within six (6) months of the Commission's 
original order. See Ney v. Harrison/ 5 Utah 2d 
217, 299 P.2d 1114 (1956) involving an eleven 
(11) month period between the time a default judg-
ment was rendered and a petition under Rule 60(b)(7) 
was filed. The Commission found that the defendant 
had presented reasonable grounds and that the motion 
must be granted to avoid inequity (R. 184). 
Equity is of principal concern in granting 
relief under Rule 60(b). Ney v. Harrison/ (supra), 
is of significance in examining the role of equity 
in Rule 60(b) cases. In Hey v. Harrison, (supra), 
as in this case mistake was a basis for invoking 
relief under Rule 60 (b). The defendant in Ney 
had mistakenly believed that she was fully protected 
by an earlier divorce decree. The plaintiff argued 
that the type of mistake was a mistake of law not 
covered by Rule 60(b). Plaintiff further pointed 
out that under the common law all judgments were 
final and that statutes in derogation of common law 
must be strictly construed. This court declared that 
such a rule has no application in the State of Utah 
and that the rules of equity should be followed. 
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Our Civil Code expressly provides: 
"The rule of the common law that 
statutes are to be strictly cons trued 
has not application to the statutes 
of this state. The statutes establish 
the laws of this state respecting the 
subjects1 to which they relate, and 
their provisions and all proceedings 
under them are to be liberally construed 
with a view to effect the objects of 
the statutes and to promote justice. 
Whenever there is any variance between 
the rules of equity and the rules of 
common law in reference to the same 
matter the rules of equity shall 
prevailT (At page 1116) (Emphasis 
added.) 
Equity demanded that the Public Service Commission 
reopen the case in light of: (1) the defendant, 
Duane Hall, paid almost forty times more than what 
his original permit was worth; (2) the defendant 
sought the counsel and advice of several attorneys; 
(3) he contacted the Public Service Commission in an 
attempt to straighten the matter out; and (4) the 
Commission had based its earlier decision on an 
erroneous assumption. 
This court stated in Warren v. Dixon Ranch 
Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741, 742 (1953) that: 
"Equity considers factors which 
may be irrelevant in actions at law, 
such as the unfairness of a partyfs 
conduct, his delay in bringing or 
continuing the action, the hardship 
in granting or denying relief. 
Although an equity court no longer has 
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complete discretion in granting or 
denying relief it may exercise wide 
judicial discretion in weighing the 
factors of fairness and public 
convenience/ and this court on 
appeal will reverse the trial court 
only where an abuse of this discretion 
is clearly shown," (Emphasis added.) 
The application of Rule 60(b) was also 
considered in Dixon v. Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240 P.2d 
1211 (1952). There the court stated that the sign-
ing and entering of a formal order based upon the 
erroneous assumption that it conformed to a direction 
of the court was sufficient grounds to invoke Rule 
60(b)(7). The court said that to have done otherwise 
would have worked a grave injustice upon the party 
seeking relief. "Furthermore, in absence of a rule 
to that effect [Rule 60(b)(7)], the court, perhaps, 
had inherent power to set the formal order aside 
anyway." (At page 1214) 
The situation in the Dixon case is analogous 
to the present one in that the Public Service 
Commission based its order upon an erroneous assumption, 
thinking it had complied with the wishes of the court. 
However, when the defendant filed its Motion for 
Rehearing, the Commission realized that it had not and 
granted a rehearing finding that sufficient reasons 
had been presented to justify a modification of its 
former order. 
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II. 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION HAS 
BROAD DISCRETION IN MAKING ITS DETER-
MINATIONS AND THESE DETERMINATIONS ARE 
PRESUMED VALID BY THIS COURT. 
The Public Service Commission was established 
as an administrative body to regulate public utilities. 
Because of its continuous dealings in this field, 
it is assumed that the Public Service Commission 
has acquired a special expertise in handling problems 
that arise within the area of public utilities. This 
fact has been recognized by the courts as witnessed 
by a statement in Armored Motors Service v. Public 
Service Commission, 23 Utah 2d 418, 464 P.2d 582 
(1970) , wherein the court declared: 
11
 o o . It must also be realized 
that the legislature has given the 
commission the responsibility for the 
overall planning and regulation of 
certain public services, including 
transportation. Because that is 
the purpose for which the commission 
was established and functions, it is 
assumed to have specialized knowledge 
and expertise in the field. Conse-
quently it is accorded comparatively 
broad prerogatives in carrying on 
investigations and making determina-
tions in the discharge of its duties• 
For these reasons its findings and 
orders are endowed with the presump-
tion of verity; and upon appeal to 
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this court we assume that the 
commission believed those aspects 
of the evidence which support its 
findings and we review the record 
in the light most favorable to them. 
(At page 584) (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Gas Service v, Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 18 
Utah 2d 310, 422 P.2d 530 (1967), wherein this 
court stated: 
"When the commission, in 
performing its duties has given 
consideration to pertinent facts 
and has made its findings and 
decision, they are endowed with 
a presumption of validity and 
correctness. In accordance 
with the recognized prerogatives 
of the trier of the facts, on 
appeal the evidence is viewed in the 
light most favorable to sustaining 
them; and the decision will not 
be reversed unless when the evidence 
is so viewed, there is no reasonable 
basis to support the commission's" 
action, so that it thus appears to 
be capricious and arbitrary, a 
situation which is not shown to 
exist here/1 (At page 533) (Emphasis 
added.) 
Hence, a ruling or an order issued by the Public 
Service Commission is presumed valid because of that 
body's unique position. As an administrative body, 
the Public Service Commission is able to draw upon 
years of experience and expertise in weighing the 
facts as they are presented. Its decision to reopen 
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is endowed with a presumption of validity and should 
not be reversed, 
III. 
THE RULING OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION GRANTING THE MOTION TO REOPEN 
IS PRESUMED CORRECT AND CAN ONLY BE 
OVERTURNED IF SHOWN TO BE ARBITRARY 
OR CAPRICIOUS, WHICH SHOWING APPELLANTS 
HAVE FAILED TO MAKE. 
When the Public Service Commission issues 
an order or a ruling, and a party seeks review, this 
court may only reverse the Commission's decision 
if the appellant can show that the Commission 
abused its discretion. "Abuse of discretion" has 
been defined by this court to be: 
?By an abuse of discretion, 
* * *is meant a clearlyerroneous 
conclusion and judgment—one that 
is clearly against the logic and 
effect of such facts as are presented 
in support of the application, or 
against the reasonable and probable 
deductions to be drawn from the facts 
disclosed upon the hearing." 
State v. Draper, 83 Utah 115, 27 P.2d 
39, 49, 50 (1933). 
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This definition has been adopted by the Oregon Supreme 
Court in the case of Port of Umatilla v, Richmond/ 212 
Ore. 596, 321 P.2d 338 (1958). Also see Robinson v. 
Olzendam, 38 Wash.2d 30, 227 P.2d 732 (1951). 
As examination of the record clearly shows 
that the Commission did not abuse discretion. Before 
granting the motion for rehearing the Commission examined 
extensive supporting and opposing memorandum. The 
Commission also made an exhaustive examination of the 
record of the proceedings and the decision of this 
honorable court in Murphy v. Public Service Commission of 
Utah, supra. After these involved deliberations the 
Commission made its finding that equity required the 
granting of the motion to reopen. 
In an action such as this one, the burden 
of proof is on the appellants to show that an abuse 
of discretion occurred. In Lewis v. Wycoff, 18 Utah 2d 
255, 420 P.2d 264 (1966), this court stated: 
"Due to the responsibility 
imposed upon the commission, and 
its presumed knowledge and exper-
tise in this field, its findings 
and order are supported by certain 
well-recognized rules of review: 
They are endowed with a presumption 
of validity and correctness; and 
the burden is upon the plaintiff to 
show that they are in error. We 
survey the evidence in the light 
most favorable to sustaining them; 
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and we will not reverse unless 
there is no reasonable basis 
therein to support them so 
that it appears that the 
commission's action was 
capricious and arbitrary." 
(At page 266) (Emphasis added*} 
Several years earlier the court in Hotel Utah 
Co. v, Industrial Commission, 116 Utah 443, 211 P.2d 200 
(1949), declared: 
"The authority to determine which 
type of unit is appropriate is vested 
in the board and not in this court. 
If the discretion so granted is 
reasonably exercised, the finding 
cannot be set aside. It is only 
in those cases wherein we can find 
the board has abused its discretion 
that we may interfere. And if 
appellant seeks to reverse the 
finding of the board because of 
an abuse of discretion in selecting 
the appropriate unit the burden is 
on it to establish the abused n 
(At page 20 3) (Emphasis added.) 
Not one scintilla of fact or evidence points 
to arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the 
commission. Based on the totality of the circumstances, 
the Commission did not abuse discretion, and its 
decision should stand. Appellants have failed to meet 
their burden and the action of the Commission should be 
sustained. Appellants have failed to show that the 
Commission abused discretion and the action of the 
Commission must be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Public Service Commission had jurisdiction 
to rehear the case under Rule 60(b)(7) of the U.R.C.P. 
No one was in a better position than the Public Service 
Commission to make a decision in the present case. 
Using its expertise in this field and its special 
knowledge of the facts of the case, the Commission 
issued a well-reasoned order; designed to eliminate 
the inequitites that had resulted from its previous 
decision. Because of its unique position as the 
trier of fact, its decision is presumed to be valid. 
A party questioning the validity of the order assumes 
the burden of showing that it is in fact arbitrary and 
unreasonable. This the appellants have failed to do. 
Therefore the Public Service Commission respectfully 
requests the Court to affirm its order and judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
BRINTON R. BURBIDGE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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